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1. Network Effects  
 
Direct network effects arise if each user's payoff from the adoption of a good, and 
his incentive to adopt it, increase as more others adopt it; that is, if adoption by different 
users is complementary. For example, telecommunications users gain directly from more 
widespread adoption, and telecommunications networks with more users are also more 
attractive to non-users contemplating adoption. 
Indirect network effects arise if adoption is complementary because of its effect 
on a related market.  For example, users of hardware may gain when other users join 
them, not because of any direct benefit, but because it encourages the provision of more 
and better software. 
Extensive case studies and more formal econometric evidence document 
significant network effects in many areas including, for example, telecommunications, 
radio and TV, computer hardware and software, applications software and operating 
systems (including Microsoft’s), securities markets and exchanges (including Ebay), and 
credit cards (see, for example, Gabel (1991), Rohlfs (2001), Shy (2001), and Gandal’s 
(forthcoming) article in this Volume). 
 
Usually adoption prices do not fully internalize the network effects, so there is a 
positive externality from adoption. A single network product therefore tends to be under-
adopted at the margin – this issue was the main focus of the early literature (see, e.g., 
Leibenstein (1950), Rohlfs (1974)).  However, if two networks compete, then adopting 
one network means not adopting the other which dilutes or reverses the externality.    
 
More interestingly – and the starting point for the more recent literature - network 
effects create incentives to “herd” with others.  In a static (simultaneous-adoption) game 
there are often multiple equilibria, so expectations are crucial, and self-fulfilling. 
Likewise a dynamic (sequential-adoption) game exhibits positive feedback or “tipping” –
a network that looks like succeeding will as a result do so (see, e.g., David (1985), 
Arthur (1989), Arthur and Rusczcynski (1992)).  How well competition among incompatible networks works depends dramatically 
on how adopters form expectations and coordinate their choices.  If adopters smoothly 
coordinate on the best deals, vendors face strong pressure to offer them.  Competition 
may then be unusually fierce because all-or-nothing competition neutralizes horizontal 
differentiation – since adopters focus not on matching a product to their own tastes but on 
joining the expected winner.   
  However, coordination is not easy. With simultaneous adoption, adopters may fail 
to coordinate at all and “splinter” among different networks, or may coordinate on a 
different equilibrium than the one that is best for them - for example, each adopter may 
expect others to choose a low-quality product because it is produced by a firm that was 
successful in the past.  Furthermore, consensus standard-setting (informally or through 
standards organizations) can be painfully slow when different adopters prefer different 
coordinated outcomes (see Bulow and Klemperer  (1999)).  Coordination through 
contingent contracts is possible in theory (see, e.g., Dybvig and Spatt (1983), Segal 
(1999)), but seems uncommon in practice. 
When adoption is sequential, we see early instability and later lock-in (see, e.g., 
Arthur (1989)) – this corresponds to the multiple equilibria that arise with simultaneous 
adoption.  Because early adoptions influence later ones, long-term behavior is determined 
largely by early events, whether accidental or strategic.  In theory, at least, fully 
sequential adoption achieves the efficient outcome if it is best for all adopters, but more 
generally early adopters’ preferences count for more than later adopters’: this is “excess 
early power”. Note that “excess early power” does not depend on “excess inertia”, that is, 
on incompatible transitions being too hard given ex post incompatibility. (Both “excess 
inertia”, and its opposite, “excess momentum”, are theoretically possible, see Farrell and 
Saloner (1985).)  
Firms promoting incompatible networks compete to win the pivotal early 
adopters, and so achieve ex post dominance and monopoly rents.  Strategies such as 
penetration pricing and preannouncements (see, e.g., Farrell and Saloner (1986)) are 
common.  History, and especially market share, matter because an installed base both 
directly means a firm offers more network benefits and boosts expectations about its 
future sales.  Such “Schumpeterian” competition “for the market” can neutralize (or even overturn) excess early power if promoters of networks that will be more efficient later on 
set low penetration prices in anticipation of this (see Katz and Shapiro (1986a)).  More 
commonly, though, late developers struggle while networks that are preferred by early 
pivotal customers thrive.  
So early preferences and early information are likely to be excessively important 
in determining long-term outcomes. For example, whether or not the Dvorak typewriter 
keyboard is really much better than QWERTY (as David (1985) contends), there clearly 
was a chance in the 1800s that a keyboard superior to QWERTY would later be 
developed, and it is not clear what could have persuaded early generations of typists to 
wait, or to adopt diverse keyboards, if that was socially desirable.  So it seems unlikely 
that the market gave a very good test of whether or not waiting was efficient. (Liebowitz 
and Margolis (1990) and Liebowitz (2002) contest both the details of the QWERTY 
example, and that network effects are significant more generally, but at least the second 
view is probably a minority one.) 
 
Despite the possibility of competition for the market passing ex post rents through 
to earlier buyers, incompatibility often reduces efficiency and harms consumers in several 
ways:  
Incompatibility means that consumers are faced with either a segmented market 
with low network benefits, or – if the market does “tip” all the way to one network – with 
reduced product variety and without the option value from the possibility that a currently 
inferior technology might later become superior.  Product variety is more sustainable if 
niche products are compatible with the mainstream, and so don’t force users to sacrifice 
network effects.   
These direct costs of poor coordination by adopters may be excacerbated by 
weaker incentives for vendors to offer good deals.  For example, if a firm like Microsoft 
is widely believed to have the ability to offer the highest quality, it may never bother to 
do so: the fact that everyone expects Microsoft  could recapture the market if it ever lost 
any one cohort of customers (or lost any one cohort of providers of complementary 
products), means everyone rationally chooses Microsoft even if it never actually produces 
high quality or offers a low price (see Katz and Shapiro (1992)). Ex post rents are often not fully dissipated by ex ante competition, especially if 
expectations fail to track relative surplus.  Worse, the rent dissipation that does occur may 
be wasteful, such as socially inefficient marketing. At best, ex ante competition induces 
“bargain-then-ripoff” pricing (low to attract business, high to extract surplus) but this 
distorts buyers' quantity choices and gives them artificial incentives to be or appear 
pivotal.  
Furthermore, outcomes are biased in favor of a proprietary technology (e.g., 
Microsoft’s) whose single owner has the incentive to market it strategically over “open” 
unsponsored alternatives (e.g., Linux)  - see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro (1986b).  As 
discussed above, outcomes are also often biased in favor of networks that are more 
efficient early on, and are generally biased in favor of established firms on whom 
expectations focus.  The last bias implies entry with proprietary network effects is often 
nearly impossible (and frequently much too hard from the social viewpoint even given 
incompatibility).  And this in turn makes it easier to recoup profits after predatory 
behaviour that eliminates a rival, and so encourages such predation. 
So while incompatibility does not necessarily damage competition, it often does, 
and firms may therefore also dissipate further resources creating and defending 
incompatibility. 
 
If firms offer compatible products, then consumers don’t need to buy from the 
same firm to enjoy full network benefits, and (differentiated)  products will be better 
matched with customers. Consumers will be willing to pay more for these benefits, and 
this may encourage firms to choose compatibility.  But compatibility often intensifies 
competition and nullifies the competitive advantage of a large installed base, whereas 
proprietary networks tend to make competition all-or-nothing, with the advantage going 
to large firms,  and may completely shut out weaker firms.  So large firms and those who 
are good at steering adopters’ expectations may prefer their products to be incompatible 
with rivals’ (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro (1985), Bresnahan (2001)), and may be able to 
use their intellectual property to enforce this.  
 Competition with incompatible network effects is closely related to other forms of 
competition when market share is important, especially competition when consumers 
have switching costs (see, e.g., Klemperer (1995), Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming), 
and the companion-piece to this article, Klemperer (forthcoming)), and has similar 
broader implications (e.g., for international trade, see Froot and Klemperer (1989)).    
 
Because competition “for the market” differs greatly from conventional 
competition “in the market”, and especially because capturing consumers’ and 
complementors’ expectations can be so profitable, competition policy needs to be vigilant 
against predatory or exclusionary tactics by advantaged firms, including deliberately 
creating incompatibility by misusing intellectual property protection. Thus, for example, 
the network effect by which more popular operating systems attract more applications 
software took centre stage in both the US and the European Microsoft cases (see, e.g., 
Bresnahan (2001)).  And, because coordination is often important and difficult, 
institutions such as standards organizations matter, and government procurement policy 
takes on more significance than usual. 
  
In summary, network effects can involve efficient competition for larger units of 
business --- "competition for the market" --- but very often make competition, especially 
entry, less effective.  So I, and others, recommend public policymakers should have a 
cautious presumption in favor of compatibility, and should look particularly carefully at 
markets where incompatibility is strategically chosen rather than inevitable.  
 
Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming) contains a recent and comprehensive survey 
of network effects. 
 
  Paul Klemperer,  
Member, UK Competition Commission, and 
Edgeworth Professor of Economics, University of Oxford.   
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A product exhibits classic switching costs if a buyer will purchase it repeatedly and find 
it costly to switch from one seller to another.  For example, there are high transaction 
costs in closing an account with a bank and opening another with a competitor; there may 
be substantial learning costs involved in switching between computer-software packages; 
and switching costs can also be created by non-linear pricing as, for example, when an 
airline enrols passengers in a “frequent flyer” program that gives them free trips after 
flying a certain number of miles with that airline.  
 
Switching costs also arise if a buyer will purchase “follow-on”, or “aftermarket”, 
products such as service, refills or repairs, and find it difficult to switch from the supplier 
of the original product.  In short, switching costs are created whenever the consumer 
makes an investment specific to his current seller, that must be duplicated for any new 
seller.   
 
Large switching costs lock in a buyer once he makes an initial purchase, so unless sellers 
specify all the future prices and qualities of their products, a long-term relationship is 
governed by short-term contracts.  This creates ex post market power, for which firms 
compete ex ante; they use strategies such as penetration pricing, price wars, and 
introductory offers to fight for market share that will generate future profits (see e.g. 
Klemperer (1987a, 1989)). 
 
The central question in the literature is the extent to which this fierce ex ante competition 
for buyers is an adequate substitute for more standard period-by-period competition 
without switching costs.   
 
In the simplest models, firms’ low “bargain” prices to new customers exactly compensate 
buyers for the high “rip-off” prices they will pay after lock-in, so buyers’ total “life-
cycle” payments are unaffected by their switching costs, and the absence of any price 
commitments leads to no inefficiencies.  But things do not usually work so well:   
  Most theoretical models confirm the popular intuition that switching costs raise firms’ 
profits, and lower social welfare. Switching costs can segment even an otherwise 
undifferentiated market as firms concentrate on exploiting their established customers 
and do not compete aggressively for their rivals’ buyers. Unless new firms will enter the 
market in the future, an existing firm would usually expect to earn future profits even if it 
made no current sales (because it could then usually capture a few of its rivals’ lower-
switching cost customers, by setting a lower price than its rivals).  So rent dissipation is 
low, allowing oligopolists to extract positive profits overall (as illustrated by Farrell and 
Shapiro (1988), Padilla (1995), Chen (1997), Taylor (2003), and others).  Furthermore, 
consumers facing switching costs care about expected future prices as well as about 
current prices, and are therefore generally less sensitive to current prices than absent 
switching costs. So firms generally have less incentive to cut prices, and prices and 
profits are therefore higher, than absent switching costs (see Klemperer (1987b), Beggs 
and Klemperer (1992)).  Although it is possible to construct models in which switching 
costs lower profits by making special assumptions about consumers’ expectations and 
tastes (see von Weizsäcker (1984)), and there is little convincing empirical evidence, the 
limited laboratory evidence suggests switching costs raise profits (see Cason and 
Friedman (2002)). 
  
Even when ex ante competition fully dissipates ex post rents, it may do so in 
unproductive ways such as through socially inefficient marketing. The “lo-hi” pricing 
patterns distort buyers’ choices – for example, if a printer is priced below cost but the 
locked-in ink is expensive, buyers may buy an over-specified printer but then use it too 
little from the social viewpoint.  Such pricing also gives customers wrong signals about 
whether to switch.  If consumers do switch, direct costs are incurred (Klemperer (1988)), 
and if consumers avoid those costs by not switching, that obstructs efficient matching 
between buyers and sellers.  Product variety is less sustainable in the market than if niche 
products are compatible with mainstream products and so don’t require new users to 
incur switching costs.   
 Switching costs also hamper forms of entry that must persuade customers to pay those 
costs, in particular, large-scale entry that seeks to attract other firms’ customers (for 
instance to achieve minimum viable scale, if the market is not growing quickly) 
(Klemperer (1987c)).  The difficulty of new entry may be broadly efficient given 
switching costs, but is nevertheless a social cost of switching costs. 
 
So switching costs often damage competition, and firms may therefore also dissipate 
further resources creating and defending incompatibilities – as, for example, when 
Gillette famously, and repeatedly, changed the design of its razors to prevent competing 
manufacturers from selling compatible blades.  Likewise, it is alleged that both IBM and 
Microsoft have deliberately obstructed compatibility between their products and those of 
their competitors, and Kodak tried to prevent independent repair firms from servicing its 
photocopiers. 
 
The bargain-then-ripoff pricing structure is clearest when new and locked-in customers 
are clearly distinguished and can be charged separate prices, for example, when prices are 
individually negotiated, or when locked-in customers buy separate “follow-on” products 
such as parts and service, rather than repeatedly buying the same good.   
 
If, instead, each firm has to set a single price to old (locked-in) and new customers (see 
Beggs and Klemperer (1992)), that price must compromise between a high price to 
exploit current locked-in buyers, and a lower price to attract more buyers to lock in and 
exploit later.  The implications for competition and welfare are similar to those for the 
bargain-then-ripoff case above, except that here switching costs also create a “fat-cat” 
effect: firms with large customer bases set higher prices, because they have more to gain 
from harvesting current customers than winning new ones.  
 
On the one hand the “fat-cat” effect is a further force for high prices -  firms price less 
aggressively both because they recognise that if they win fewer customers today, their 
rivals will be “fatter” and therefore less aggressive tomorrow, and because consumers 
recognise this too and so are less impressed by lower current prices.  On the other hand it actually facilitates entry that focuses purely on new customers - since an incumbent’s 
incentive to set a high price against its locked-in buyers creates a price umbrella under 
which a new entrant can come in.   
 
The fat-cat effect means large shares tend to shrink and small shares to grow; when 
firms’ shares are similar, they return to stable steady state after any shock. More 
generally, the tradeoff between harvesting old customers and investing in new ones 
depends on interest rates, the state of the business cycle, expectations about exchange-
rates, etc, with implications for macroeconomics and international trade (Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1996), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Klemperer (1995)).   
 
Some of the same issues as with switching costs arise when shops advertise only some of 
their prices: customers become “locked in” as they bear the costs of going to a shop, and 
only afterwards learn its other prices. Just as with dynamic switching costs, this tends to 
produce bargains on advertised (“loss leader”) prices and corresponding ripoffs on un-
advertised prices (see Lal and Matutes (1994)). 
 
Also closely related are “shopping-cost” markets where consumers face costs of using 
different suppliers for different goods in a single period but all prices are advertised 
(though neither time nor commitment problems are central in these markets).  Shopping 
costs encourage firms to offer a full product line – for example, a supermarket stocks a 
broad range of products to encourage consumers to shop only there  – and so help explain 
multi-product firms.  Indeed firms’ product ranges may be too broad from the social 
viewpoint (Klemperer and Padilla (1997)), but may also be too similar to each other 
(Klemperer (1992)) so that there is too little variety in the market as a whole. Shopping 
costs also make single-product entry hard.  However, the “mix-and-match” literature, 
beginning with Matutes and Regibeau (1988), suggests that firms typically prefer to be 
compatible (no shopping costs) rather than incompatible (infinite shopping costs), at least 
in symmetric single-period duopolies. 
 Other literature related to switching costs includes that on network effects (see e.g. 
Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming), and the companion-piece to this article, Klemperer 
(forthcoming)), search costs (see e.g. Stiglitz (1989)), and “experience goods” (see e.g. 
Schmalensee (1982)). 
 
The theoretical literature on switching costs described above arguably began with Selten's 
(1965) model of “demand inertia” (which assumed a firm's current sales depended in part 
on history, even though it did not explicitly model consumers' behavior in the presence of 
switching costs), and then took off in the 1980s with contributions from von Weizsäcker 
(1984), Klemperer (1983, 1987a,b,c), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), and others. But 
although there is an extensive empirical marketing literature on brand loyalty (or “state 
dependence”) which often reflects, or has equivalent effects to, switching costs 
(summarized in, Seetharam et al. (1999)), the empirical economics literature on switching 
costs is smaller and more recent than the theoretical literature.  
 
Only a few studies attempt to directly measure switching costs. Where micro data on 
individual consumers' purchases are available, a discrete choice approach can be used to 
explore the determinants of a consumer's probability of purchasing from a particular firm 
(e.g., Greenstein (1993) on computer systems procurement, Shum (1999) on breakfast 
cereal purchases), but because switching costs are usually both consumer-specific and not 
directly observable, and micro data on individual consumers' purchase histories are 
seldom available, less direct methods of assessing the level of switching costs are often 
needed (e.g. Kim et al. (2003) estimate a first-order condition and demand and supply 
equations  for Norwegian bank loans, and Shy (2002) uses data on prices and market 
shares for the Israeli cellular phone market). 
 
One defect of most empirical studies is that few of them model the dynamic effects of 
switching costs that are the main focus of the theoretical literature; most of them assume 
consumers myopically maximize current utility without considering the future effects of 
their choices.  
 Nevertheless the empirical literature does suggest that switching costs play an important 
role in many industries including credit cards, cigarettes, supermarkets, air travel, phone 
services, electricity suppliers, bookstores, and automobile insurance – see Farrell and 
Klemperer (forthcoming) for references, and Klemperer (1995) for more examples of 
markets with switching costs; as technology continues to develop, products become more 
complex, and services become more important, the importance of switching costs seems 
likely to increase further. 
 
Because switching costs very often make competition, and especially entry, less effective, 
I (and many others) favor cautiously pro-compatibility public policy. Policymakers 
should look particularly carefully at markets where incompatibility is strategically chosen 
rather than inevitable. Because buyers’ early choices are often crucial, and depend on 
their expectations about firms’ future behavior, provision of information and consumer 
protection against deception, etc. are more important than usual. And competition policy 
must recognize that the analysis of mergers, monopolization, intellectual property, and 
predation, are all affected by switching costs; it is unsurprising that switching costs have 
featured importantly in many of the world’s best-known and most significant antitrust 
cases, including the IBM, the Kodak, and the European Microsoft cases. 
 




  Paul Klemperer,  
Member, UK Competition Commission, and 
Edgeworth Professor of Economics, University of Oxford. 
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